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Verified Boot and Encrypted Storage for an Energy Field Device

Confidential - energy/IoT device manufacturer

Embedded Security - Verified Boot and Encrypted Storage for an Energy Field Device

Challenge, Approach, Outcome

1

Challenge

A field-deployed energy monitoring device needed an unbroken chain of trust from power-on to the Linux rootfs - plus encrypted data storage.

2

Approach

A HABv4 verified boot chain (SPL, U-Boot, fitImage) with an RSA-4096 PKI and Yocto-integrated signing, a dm-verity-verified read-only SquashFS rootfs with minimized overlay paths, dm-crypt storage with a CAAM-wrapped key, plus signed RPM updates and a migration guide for existing field devices.

3

Outcome

The verified boot chain and encrypted storage run on the hardware, and a documented migration path brings existing field devices onto the secure system.

Technologies Used

Project Description

A field-deployed energy monitoring device (NXP i.MX6 family, Yocto Kirkstone, U-Boot 2024.01, kernel 6.1) needed protection against tampering. Drivers were the EU Cyber Resilience Act, ISO/IEC 27400 and NIST 8259, plus protection of device and access data.

The consultancy team built an unbroken chain of trust: the boot ROM verifies a signed SPL, the SPL verifies the signed U-Boot, and U-Boot verifies the signed fitImage (kernel and device tree) via NXP High Assurance Boot (HABv4). An RSA-4096 PKI with four SRKs is generated with the NXP CST; signing is integrated into the Yocto build via a bbclass, including SRK fusing, hab_status verification and SRK revoke for key rolling.

Because the existing UBIFS rootfs is not dm-verity-capable, the fitImage was separated into its own UBI partitions and the rootfs rebuilt as read-only SquashFS with an A/B layout. An initramfs compiled into the kernel verifies the ECDSA P-256-signed dm-verity root hash before the rootfs is mounted. Writable paths were minimized and run via overlayfs into a dm-crypt container on the eMMC whose key is CAAM-wrapped (OTPMK keyblob) - a deliberate tradeoff, since the mainline-based vendor BSP does not ship NXP's hidden-key drivers.

Updates are verified as signed RPM packages through DNF. The work also produced bootloader update runbooks (Linux, TFTP, UUU/SDP) and a migration guide for existing field devices onto the secure system.

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