USB Boot with HAB Signature Verification for Secure Embedded Linux
Confidential - energy/IoT device manufacturer

Challenge, Approach, Outcome
Challenge
A secure field device needs a service recovery path: boot signed images from a USB stick without weakening the HAB chain of trust.
Approach
Extending the U-Boot autoboot environment with a USB path: usb start, fatload of fitImage and device tree from a FAT stick, HAB signature verification of the fitImage before bootm - then booting the dm-verity-protected system, documented with boot logs and failure analysis.
Outcome
The spike is complete: HAB-authenticated USB boot was demonstrated on hardware (FIT hash verified, kernel 6.1 starts). Constraints documented: about 20 MiB/s USB read speed, required dm-verity env file, initramfs shell gap; testing on a closed device remains open.
Technologies Used
Project Description
I extended the U-Boot environment (2024.01) with a USB boot path: usb start, fatload of fitImage and device tree from the stick, usb stop, then HAB authentication of the fitImage before bootm with the matching DTB configuration. If the signature check fails, nothing is booted.
The boot log proves the chain: FIT subimages are verified with sha256, kernel 6.1 starts, and the dm-verity initramfs takes over rootfs verification. Practical findings: slow USB sticks run into EHCI timeouts (about 20 MiB/s read speed required); the initramfs expects the .verity.env file on the stick; a getty workaround was documented for shell access inside the initramfs.
Open items at the end of the spike: a dedicated USB initramfs with shell, and testing on a device with burnt SRK fuses (closed state).